
Buffer Overflow Attack Taxonomy
A Practical Perspective for Embedded Systems
18 June 2025
Ranjith Tharayil Published: June 2025
Keywords: Buffer Overflow, Embedded Systems, Memory Corruption, C/C++ Security, Secure Software Engineering, Exploit Mitigation, Low-Level Systems Security
Buffer overflows are one of the oldest and most impactful classes of software vulnerabilities, particularly prevalent in embedded systems programmed in C and C++. The combination of direct memory access, manual memory management, and the absence of runtime safety checks makes such environments highly susceptible to memory corruption attacks. This paper presents a categorized taxonomy of buffer overflow vulnerabilities relevant to embedded systems, supported by code-level illustrations, exploitation insights, and secure programming guidelines. The goal is to equip embedded developers, security engineers, and system architects with a structured understanding of these vulnerabilities and their real-world implications.
Embedded systems continue to form the backbone of modern computing infrastructure — from consumer electronics and automotive ECUs to critical industrial controllers. In these domains, efficiency, determinism, and low-level hardware control take precedence, making C and C++ the dominant languages. However, their lack of built-in memory safety and reliance on direct pointer manipulation have long exposed embedded applications to a wide spectrum of vulnerabilities.
Among them, buffer overflows remain both persistent and dangerous, capable of undermining system integrity, leaking sensitive data, or enabling full system compromise. This paper aims to systematically classify the major types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities, highlighting how each manifests in embedded software, and what practical steps can be taken to mitigate them.
Each category in the taxonomy is explained with a concise description, typical exploitation vector, consequences, and secure coding recommendations.
Overview: A classic vulnerability where data written to a local stack buffer overflows into adjacent memory — commonly overwriting the saved return address.
Attack Vector: Stack smashing; redirecting execution flow via corrupted control data.
Impact: Arbitrary code execution, system takeover.
Example:
void vulnerable() {
char buf[64];
gets(buf); // No bounds checking — highly unsafe
}
Mitigation:
gets
and similar unsafe functions with fgets
or safer alternatives.-fstack-protector
, -fstack-protector-strong
).Overview: Data exceeding the bounds of heap-allocated memory can corrupt adjacent objects or heap metadata, leading to serious exploitation opportunities.
Attack Vector: Overwrite of allocator control structures or neighboring heap blocks.
Impact: Use-after-free conditions, arbitrary memory writes, or control flow hijacking.
Example:
char *buf1 = malloc(64);
char *buf2 = malloc(64);
strcpy(buf1, attacker_input); // May overflow into buf2
Mitigation:
strncpy
and validate input lengths.malloc
).Overview: A subtle variant where a loop or copy operation writes one byte beyond the intended boundary, possibly corrupting adjacent metadata like canaries or pointers.
Attack Vector: Overflow by a single byte to affect control-sensitive fields.
Impact: Security bypass, integrity loss of stack frames or allocator metadata.
Example:
char buf[8];
for (int i = 0; i <= 8; i++) // Off-by-one bug
buf[i] = input[i];
Mitigation:
i < N
vs i <= N
).sizeof()
and static analysis tools to detect off-by-one patterns.Overview: Occurs when user-controlled input is used to determine a write target, often via unchecked pointer dereferencing.
Attack Vector: Gaining control over a write destination pointer.
Impact: Overwriting of function pointers, configuration, or control flags.
Example:
void write_anywhere(char* addr, char val) {
*addr = val; // Dangerous if addr is attacker-controlled
}
Mitigation:
Overview: Overwriting return addresses or function pointers to divert execution flow to attacker-supplied locations.
Attack Vector: Exploiting function pointer writes or stack corruption.
Impact: Execution of attacker-defined code.
Example:
void (*func_ptr)() = safe_function;
strcpy((char *)&func_ptr, input); // Overwrites function pointer
func_ptr(); // May call arbitrary code
Mitigation:
Overview: Stack canaries are placed before return addresses to detect corruption. Attackers may try to overwrite them predictably or undetectably.
Attack Vector: Overflows that include the canary region.
Impact: Bypassing stack protection mechanisms.
Example:
char buf[64];
read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, 128); // Overflows into canary
Mitigation:
-fstack-protector-strong
or similar options.Overview: Accessing memory after it has been deallocated results in undefined behavior. Attackers may reuse freed memory to inject malicious content.
Attack Vector: Dangling pointer usage.
Impact: Data corruption, remote code execution.
Example:
char *p = malloc(64);
free(p);
strcpy(p, input); // p is invalid
Mitigation:
NULL
after free.std::unique_ptr
, std::shared_ptr
) where applicable.Overview: Occurs when unvalidated user input is passed as the format string, enabling unintended memory access.
Attack Vector: printf(user_input)
without format specifiers.
Impact: Memory disclosure, control flow hijack via %n
.
Example:
printf(user_input); // Never do this
Mitigation:
printf("%s", user_input)
).Overview: A calculation determining buffer size overflows, leading to allocation of insufficient memory and subsequent buffer overrun.
Attack Vector: Arithmetic overflows during size computation.
Impact: Memory corruption due to under-allocated buffer.
Example:
int len = user_input_len * sizeof(int); // May overflow
int* buf = malloc(len);
memcpy(buf, src, user_input_len); // Actual copy exceeds buffer
Mitigation:
__builtin_mul_overflow
in GCC/Clang).Category | Attack Vector | Common Trigger | Result |
---|---|---|---|
Stack Overflow | Stack smashing | Local buffer overflow | Return address overwrite |
Heap Overflow | Metadata overwrite | Overflow on heap alloc | Arbitrary memory write |
Off-by-One | Subtle overwrite | Loop or copy boundary | Canary/pointer corruption |
Arbitrary Write | Pointer manipulation | Unchecked pointer use | Control/data overwrite |
ARC Injection | Return address corruption | Stack or pointer write | Code redirection |
Canary Overwrite | Canary bypass | Oversized input | Defeated stack protection |
Use-After-Free | Dangling pointer | Access after free | Use of attacker-controlled data |
Format String | Format injection | Unchecked format usage | Memory disclosure or write |
Integer Overflow | Allocation miscalculation | Size arithmetic error | Buffer overflow after malloc |
gets
, strcpy
, sprintf
. Prefer safer alternatives such as fgets
, snprintf
, strncpy
.-fstack-protector-strong
, and ensure OS-level protections like DEP/NX and ASLR are active.Cppcheck
, Clang Static Analyzer
, Valgrind
, and AddressSanitizer (ASan)
can catch many classes of memory bugs early.This paper is part of an ongoing initiative to enhance security awareness and defensive programming practices among embedded software developers. The insights presented here reflect field experience and continuing research in memory safety within low-level systems.
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